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 Abstract 
The paper analyses the governance choices in production quota with the Flemish nutrient production rights as a case. A static 
model of quota trade in the short run shows the inefficiency of discrete non-auctioned trade with fixed transaction costs. This 
model also shows that an obligation to quota sellers to stop their production stimulates structural change. A dynamic model of 
trade indicates that the measures taken to prevent speculative behaviour causes inefficiencies and stimulates overuse of quota 
if the penalties are too low. Finally, the dynamic model indicates that a flat rate reduction on traded quota combined with too 
low penalties for overuse stimulate the total production.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Production quota have been an important part of the EU agricultural policy of the past 
decades. The impact of the rules of quota transfers on structural change have been described 
by many authors. An important conclusion that has been drawn many times is that limitations 
on the rules of transfers slow down the structural change in agriculture and lead to a less 
competitive sector (e.g. Oskam and Speijers, 1992; Boots et al., 1997;  Colman, 2000; Van 
der Straeten et al., 2009a). The old production quota, such as the dairy quota, are about to be 
abolished but new types of production and emission rights are arising to gradually reduce the 
production or the emission by policy intervention (e.g, Van der Straeten et al., 2009b).  
The contemporary change in policy focus to more environmental concerns leads to the 
implementation of emission rights or production rights linked to environmental concerns. A 
well known example is the carbon dioxide emission right. Another example is the 
implementation of productions rights to limit the animal production in Flanders. The objective 
of this policy is to put Flanders in line with the EU nitrate directive that requires less animal 
production in Flanders. Since 2007, the nutrient production rights (NPR) limit the evolution 
of the total number of animals in Flanders.  
The Flemish NPR’s have, similar as other types of tradable production rights, inefficiencies in 
their implementation. Currently, there are more than enough production rights for the animal 
production but still 2880 farms have to pay fines for overusing of their rights. It remains also 
an open question whether the system really contributes to the objectives of the EU nitrate 
directive. Flanders has a detailed manure policy framework wherein manure use on land takes 
the most prominent role (Van der Straeten et al., 2010). If the system of fertilisation standards 
on the level of parcels works properly, than NPR’s will not have an additional value for 
obtaining the final goals of the nitrate directive, i.e. avoiding nitrate pollution.  
The current paper analyses different elements for fine-tuning the system of the Flemish 
animal production rights. Two types of models are applied to support policy makers on the 
following choices of implementation: i) trade of rights between individuals or through a 
centrally organised auctioning system; ii) forcing farms to stop their activity when selling 
production rights; iii) how to implement a gradual reduction in the total amount of rights; iv) a 
system for prevention of speculation.  
Each of the choices has an effect on the effectiveness and the efficiency of the policy and the 
choices might in turn also affect the structural evolution of the sector in question as for 
instance in the case for milk quota (Bailey, 2002; Alvarez et al. , 2006; Van der Straeten et al., 
2009a). The objective of the current paper is to make general recommendations on each of the 
policy choices based on the generic models applied to the case of the Flemish animal 
production rights. The Flemish animal production rights is a good case to study these 
phenomena because of the availability of detailed data and because the implementation differs 
across agricultural sub sectors making a comparison on actual data possible.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The second section describes the system of 
production rights of our case study and which choices about the institutional setting have been 
made. The third section introduces a model of trade with transaction costs to compare 
alternative organisation forms of the trade in production rights. The fourth section introduces 
a dynamic programming model to analyse the impact of penalties, flat rate reductions in trade 
and withdrawal of unused production rights. The paper is rounded up by an overall discussion 
and conclusion.  
2 THE NUTRIENT PRODUCTION RIGHT SYSTEM 
NPR’s are assigned at the farm level in 2007 based on the average number of animals in the 
period 1995 - 1997. Each type of animal1 corresponds to an amount of NPR’s. This amount is 
based on the average yearly excretion of nutrients of the corresponding animal type. The 
higher the joint excretion of phosphorus and nitrogen, the higher the corresponding NPR’s. In 
most cases, the amount of NPR per animal is simply the sum of the average yearly gross 
excretion of both nutrients of that animal type. Table 1 shows the amount of NPR’s per 
animal for the most important animal types in Flanders. The different types of animals are 
grouped into four animal categories: cattle, pigs, poultry and other animals. The total quantity 
                                                 
1 Animal type : combination of species, age and feeding system. 
of initially distributed NPR’s is the multiplication of the average present number of animals 
during 1995-1997 and the corresponding NPR-value. 
Table 1. The amount of nutrient production rights per animal type 
Animal type Value  Animal type Value 
Dairy cows 127  Sows 38.5 
Suckler cows  127  Piglets 4.48 
Young cattle (< 1 year) 43  Layers 1.18 
Young cattle (1-2 years) 83  Broilers  0.91 
 
Since 2007, each farm with animals is obliged to have sufficient NPR’s for all present 
animals. The calculation of the needed NPR’s is the same as applied for the initial distribution 
of the NPR’s.  
The initial distribution corresponds with the actual use of the NPR’s except that it ignores 10 
years of structural change in the agricultural sector. An initial distribution of emission or 
production rights based on historic use has the advantage of lower transaction costs than an 
even or flat distribution where a lot of transactions are needed before reaching an new 
equilibrium (Stavins, 1995).  The main policy discussions on the initial distribution of the 
NPR’s focussed on specific cases where normal farm management was not possible during 
the base period. Farms that could prove that they had an exceptional low number of animals 
during 1995-1997 due to force majeure were also allocated additional NPR’s.  
More policy discussion has focussed on the tradability of the production rights. Many authors 
(see Van de Straeten et al., 2009a) have indicated that limitations on tradability lead to a less 
efficient distribution of emission or production rights.  
The data on the application of NPR’s in Flanders have shown that also in the case of the 
NPR’s the market is far from perfect. There is at aggregate level no shortage of NPR’s due to 
a decline in the total number of animals between 1997 and 2008. Despite the surplus at the 
aggregate level, there are significant shortages at the individual farm level. In total 3 480 532 
NPR’s have been used beyond the legal limits of the NPR’s. For the concerning 2 880 farms, 
this results the first year of detected overuse on a specific farm in a fine of 1 euro per NPR, 
which is on average 1 209 euro (Table 2). The second and following years the fine would be 2 
euro resulting in an average fine of 2 418 euro.  
Table 2. The overuse of nutrient production rights in 2008.  
 Number of farms 
with overuse
Number of NPR’s 
overused
Minimal Fine per farm 
with overuse
Cattle 2 339 2 625 716 1 123
Pigs 477 1 043 900 2 188
Poultry 117 409 792 3 502
Total 2 880 3 480 532 1 209
 
One limitation that the Flemish policy makers have introduced is the restriction of trade 
between animal categories. As long as the farmer has only original allocated NPR’s, the 
NPR’s can be freely used for every type of animal. When buying NPR’s from other farms, 
these new NPR’s and the original NPR’s of that category become fixed, i.e. they are 
exclusively usable for animal types within that category. This type of transferability allows 
for structural change within an agricultural subsector, but it protects the livestock production 
subsectors from competition with each other. The motivation of this limitation on trade is the 
fear that intensive (monogastric) animal production would increase at the expense of cattle 
production. Earlier studies have shown that differences in profitability together with 
limitations on trade lead to a difference in price of the traded NPR’s depending on the 
category. The subdivision in animal categories can, however, not explain the over- and 
underuse at the farm level because there are currently sufficient NPR’s in each subsector.  
Possible explanations for the inefficient distribution of NPR’s can be found in the several 
other limits on transferability that have been introduced. One limit is that the minimum 
transferable quantity of NPR’s is 200. A second restriction is that the seller of the NPR’s must 
stop the animal activity for the respective animal category except for the cattle-category. Also 
the fact that trade in NPR’s is only possible between individual farms instead of an auctioning 
system might depress efficient trade. Each of the above limitations on trade is analysed and 
discussed in section 3 of this paper.  
The policy makers have also decided upon a number of interventions in NPR trade to reduce 
the total number of animals and to prevent speculation on the NPR value. The first objective 
should be reached by a flat rate reduction on all traded NPR’s between farmers without family 
bonds. Policy makers try to avoid speculation by a mechanism that prevents non-used NPR’s 
to be re-activated. NPR’s that are not used during the three preceding years can not be traded 
anymore but still be used by the owner. Both policy interventions can have a dynamic impact 
throughout the coming years, because both can gradually change the availability and the trade 
of NPR’s.  
Therefore, the paper relies on a model to simulate trade using a dynamic three-agent 
simulation model. The multi-period description of three firm types with heterogeneous 
production technologies allows the model to simulate structural change endogenously as a 
function of the changes in the rules of production right trade. Section 4 of this paper describes 
the model and the two policy scenarios are evaluated against alternative initial distribution of 
production rights and different penalties for overproduction.  
The first policy is a flat rate reduction of all transferred production rights. The results show 
that policy makers should carefully consider the combination of the level of this flat rate 
reduction and the penalty of overproduction. A high reduction rate on transferred production 
rights prevents non-competitive firms from selling their rights. At the same time, the initial 
distribution of the rights gives these non-competitive firms a cost advantage to continue their 
production, which they would have stopped otherwise. The competitive firms can not buy 
additional production rights and are therefore stimulated to produce more than their available 
production rights allow them while paying penalties for that. A too high flat rate reduction is 
therefore nor effective, because it stimulates production of non-competitive farms, nor 
efficient, because it favours non-competitive firms. Lower flat rates are more efficient and 
effective.  
The second policy holds firms from selling rights that have not been used for three 
consecutive years. It could be expected that this type of policy stimulates firms to hold on to 
their production to maintain the value of their production rights. The simulations show that 
this is only the case if the firms have an expectation of increasing prices of the production 
rights. As the policy is making the rights scarcer in time, the expectation of increasing prices 
could be stimulated.  
3 SHORT-RUN SIMULATION OF TRADE IN PRODUCTION RIGHTS 
3.1 Model overview 
Transfers of production rights have been organised in auctions or by bilateral trade between 
farms. The auctioning systems, such as the dairy quota trade in Canada, Denmark and 
Germany, are organised to promote a more efficient reallocation of productions rights 
(Bogetoft et al., 2003). Within the auctioning system one can distinguish single bid auctioning 
such as in dairy quota Denmark and Germany and multiple bid auctioning system of dairy 
quota in Canada.  
In many other cases of production rights, such as in Flanders, the trade is not organised in an 
auction. This means that the buyer of rights has to make the efforts of finding a seller with a 
the desired amount of rights. Each bilateral agreement between two farms results in a 
transaction recorded by the administration, which results in transaction costs. As a 
consequence, it might be possible that a buyer of rights can only satisfy his demand by 
making transactions with more than one seller. Likewise, the seller might have to look for 
several buyers to make sure that all surplus rights are sold. This might not only result in a 
higher number of transactions than in a system with auctioned trade but it may also lead to the 
fact that the amount of trade is depressed or that seller can not sell all surplus rights and that 
buyers can not obtain the desired amount of rights. Both cases are observed in the dataset of 
traded NPR’s in Flanders.  
To have an idea about the role of the ‘non-auctioned’ trade and other restrictions on trade we 
use a mixed integer programming model with fixed transactions costs.  The model minimises 
the objective function (Eq. 1) that is the sum of penalties (f) multiplied by the deficiency of 
NPR’s for each farm and animal category (µia), transaction costs (tc) multiplied by the number 
of transactions ( Σia βija ) and lost profit from reducing the animal production (ρia) multiplied 
by the gross margin of that activity (gmia).  
The deficiency of NPR’s per farm and animal category µia is calculated in Eq. 2 as a positive 
real variable that should be higher than the used NPR’s (uia) minus the available NPR’s (aia) 
and the net traded NPR’s (τija) and the reduction of the animal production (ρia).  
Another constraint (Eq. 3) imposes that the binary variable βija take the value 1 in case that a 
transaction takes place between farm i and j for an animal category a.   
Minimise Z = Σia f µia +  Σia βija  tc +  Σia ρia  gmia   
 (1) 
s.t. 
µia  ≥   uia - aia  + Σj  τija -  Σj τjia   - ρia (2) 
aia * βija  ≥ Σj  τija (3) 
The model is applied to an administrative dataset of the Flemish Land Agency (Vlaamse Land 
Maatschappij). The dataset has for each Flemish farm the available NPR’s per animal 
category described in the parameter aia and the number of present animals resulting in the 
used NPR’s described in the parameter uia. FADN data are used to assign a gross margin for 
the different animal production activities. This gross margin is expressed per NPR in the 
parameter gmia.  
The model is applied to a random subsample of the population to simulate the fact that it is for 
farmer impossible to search in the entire population for matching packets or rights for their 
demand. The larger the subsample, the more interactions are possible and the better the 
market for NPR’s is assumed to work.  
3.2 Short-run simulations of trade in NPR’s 
In the simulations we analyse the effect of the presence of transaction costs by doing a 
sensitivity analysis on the parameter tc. The analysis gives us also an idea of the impact of 
minimum transferable quantity of NPR’s of 200 NPR’s. A second restriction is that the seller 
of the NPR’s must stop the animal activity for the respective animal category except for the 
cattle-category. Also the fact that trade in NPR’s is only possible between individual farms 
instead of an auctioning system might depress efficient trade.  
3.2.1 Impact of fixed transaction costs on trade of NPR’s 
The model (Eq. 1) - (Eq. 3) is applied to a random sample of 500 Flemish farms. The size of 
the sample implies that each farm is able to acquire the information of other farms about the 
use and the availability of NPR’s. We are convinced that 500 is a very optimistic estimate 
because this implies that each farmer has the full information of each farm in its own 
municipality and four surrounding municipalities.  
The simulations with model (Eq. 1) - (Eq. 3) starts with a sensitivity analysis on the fixed 
transaction costs ‘f’ because there exists no information about these costs in the administrative 
dataset or in the FADN. The results in Table 3 indicate that the presence of fixed transaction 
costs can partly explain why farmers do not trade sufficient NPR’s to avoid penalties or 
having to reduce their animal production. The comparison of the results of the model with the 
real short run behaviour indicates that the model overestimates for all simulated transaction 
costs the intention of farms to reduces their production resulting in an underestimated overuse 
of the NPR’s.  
Despite the fact that the current information is insufficient to derive an exact value of the 
transaction cost, the comparison of the information of Table 2 with the simulation results of 
Table 3 might give an idea that the order of magnitude of the transaction cost. Using the  
population average of overusing NPR’s after one year of trade the total amount of overuse in 
the sample should correspond to 31 744, which is much higher than the sum of the simulated 
overuse and  production reduction at even a transaction cost of 900 euro.   
Table 3. The impact of increasing transaction costs on trade and production  
Trade  
Σj  τija (in NPR’s) 
Production reduction  
Σia ρia(in NPR’s) Cost per 
transaction 
tc (in euro) 
Total 
penalty 
(in euro) 
Σia f µia 
Number of 
transaction
s 
Σia βija 
other bovine pig Total other bovine pig Total
100 71 91 16 226 65 232 4 636 86 094 1 753 318 0 2 071
200 228 79 15 141 59 778 4 733 79 652 2 352 4 421 0 6 773
400 582 73 14 809 53 255 4 733 72 797 2 494 4 902 0 7 396
600 2602 57 12 318 53 795 4 183 70 297 3 971 5 739 550 10 260
800 4676 47 11 858 53 828 2 882 68 568 3 971 6 922 1 495 12 388
900 5115 44 9 673 52 020 2 725 64 418 4 988 6 922 1 495 13 405
 
3.2.2 Impact of prevention of sales of NPR’s from active farms 
Besides the fact that the trade of the NPR’s happens from farm to farm, the policy has further 
restricted the trade by imposing for all animal categories, except ‘bovine’, that the selling 
farm has to sell all his NPR’s from that activity. The idea of this policy intervention is to 
stimulate the structural change by making the production factors quicker available for the 
remaining farms.  
The comparison of the results in Table 3 and Table 4 shows that the at least in the short run 
the policy rather reduces the production and stimulates the traded amount of NPR’s compared 
to the scenario without the policy. The policy also leads to the fact that the buyers of the 
NPR’s have to buy more NPR’s than needed in the short run leading to a surplus at their farm. 
The surplus gives them, however, again the opportunity to expand production in the long run. 
The conclusion is that this policy intervention indeed stimulates the structural change in the 
agricultural sector because the amount of the traded NPR’s increases, even though the total 
number of transactions slightly decreases.  
Table 4. The impact of increasing transaction costs on trade and production in the scenario 
where the selling farms have to stop their production  
Trade  
Σj  τija (in NPR’s) 
Production reduction  
Σia ρia(in NPR’s) Cost per 
transaction 
tc (in euro) 
Total 
penalty 
(in euro) 
Σia f µia 
Number of 
transactions 
Σia βija 
Other bovine pig Total other bovine pig Total
200 131 85 106 659 190 334 14 942 311 936 4 148 15 278 0 19 426
400 822 71 103 421 149 707 13 336 266 463 5 142 25 326 0 30 468
600 2691 57 26 735 126 706 12 771 166 212 20 328 22 145 550 43 023
800 4408 46 19 786 124 448 7 104 151 338 16 263 18 832 1 495 36 590
 
The model described in this section only simulates short run adaptations to the limits 
introduced by the NPR’s. The model simulates only the possibility of buying extra rights or 
reducing the production. The model does not simulate farm growth or a multi-period planning 
to optimise the moment of selling or buying the production rights. The next section introduces 
a model that tackles these shortcomings to simulate the effect of a flat rate reduction of trade 
and the removal of unused NPR’s.  
4 MULTI-PERIOD SIMULATION OF TRADE IN PRODUCTION RIGHTS 
4.1 Model overview 
The model simulates three farm types with different quadratic cost functions representing the 
differences in production technology in the Flemish farm population. The model simulates 
production changes and trade of NPR’s of a period of 7 year by maximising the expected 
profit from production and the selling of NPR’s.  Unlike the model of previous section, the 
dynamic model assumes that the long run market operates according to the assumptions of a 
perfect market.  
The objective function (Eq. 4) maximises the depreciated revenues at interest rate r for all 
years t, farms i and animal activities a. The economic revenue is the price (op) minus the 
marginal cost multiplied by the activity level (χ). The cost function is quadratic with a linear 
(lc) parameter and a quadratic parameter (qc). Also the acquisition (Σj τtija) and the sales (Σj 
τtjia) of NPR’s is accounted for in the revenue. The price of NPR’s (np) is exogenous to the 
model. The received price for NPR’s is multiplied by 0.84 to account for the flat rate tax of 
16% that has to be paid on the income of the sales of the rights. The buyer of the rights has to 
take into account the average reduction rate (ω) of the number of rights as speculation 
prevention. Finally, the total income is reduced by the penalties (f) of overuse of the available 
NPR’s. 
Eq. 5 determines the NPR balance. Eq. 6 prevents farms from selling more NPR’s than 
available. Eq. 7 applies a reduction rate ψ to the traded NPR’s. This reduction rate is set 
minimum to the flat rate (rr) of 25% (Eq. 8) or higher than the unused NPR’s calculated in 
Eq. 9.  Eq. 9 uses the average unused NPR’s (φ) of the last three years. φ is assigned in Eq. 
11 as a function of the available NPR’s and the level of each animal activity.  Eq. 13 
calculates the average reduction rate (ω). This average reduction rate is used in the objective 
function to measure the impact on the price change as result of the reduction in the total 
available NPR’s.  
 
Maximise  
 
 (4) 
 
s.t.  
 
atia  = at-1 ia + Σj  τtija - Σj τtjia    (5) 
atia  ≥ Σj τtjia    (6) 
Σj  τtija  ψtia  ≥  Σj τtjia    (7) 
ψtia ≥ rr (8) 
ψtia ≥ (φtia + φt-1ia + φt-2ia) / 3 (9) 
φtia ≥ 0 (10) 
φtia ≥ atia - χtia / atia   (11) 
ωta ≥ 0 (12) 
ωta ≥ Σi atia - Σi χtia / Σi atia   (13) 
µtia  ≥   χtia - atia  + Σj  τtija -  Σj τtjia    (14) 
µtia  ≥  0 (15) 
4.2 Multiperiod simulations 
For reasons of transparency of the results, the generic model of the previous sub-section is 
applied to only three farm types with 1 animal activity with hypothetical cost function 
parameters. The results of the simulations should therefore be interpreted as illustration of the 
mechanisms of the policy impact on trade and production rather than as actual predictions of 
production or trade shifts that will occur.  
The profit function parameters of the three farm types are described in Table 5. Given the 
parameters in Table 5, the unconstrained maximum profit would be reached at a production of 
10 for farm 1, 2.5 for farm 2 and 5 for farm 3.  
Table 5. The parameters for the three farm types in the model  
Farm /  Output price ‘op’ Linear cost parameter  ‘lc’ Quadratic cost parameter  ‘qc’ 
1 20 10 0.5 
2 20 10 2 
3 20 10 1 
 
These parameters are used in combination with changes of all other parameters in the model 
such as the penalty level ‘f’, the initial distribution of NPR’s ‘a’, the reduction rate ‘rr’, and 
the presence of the Eq. (8).  
Some simulations confirm what could have been expected and what has been described 
already by other authors. We will not discuss these simulations in detail such as the fact that 
the level of the penalty ‘f’ has indeed an impact on the traded quantities. At lower levels of ‘f’ 
it becomes more profitable to oversupply and pay the penalty instead of reducing the 
production or buying additional rights. This finding could also be confirmed by the model of 
section 3 with actual penalty levels and realistic data on gross margins.  
The simulations also confirm the findings of, e.g. Hahn and Noll (1982), Hahn (1984) and 
Stavins (1995) that the initial distribution ‘a’ of the rights does play a role in the final 
distribution of the production rights because of the presence of transaction costs.  
We will focus on the simulations of changes of parameters that have not been discussed yet in 
the literature. The simulations performed with focus on changes in the Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) 
yield less obvious results. In the Eq. (8), the reduction rate ‘rr’ can be increased to see the 
impact on the transactions and the activity levels. The flat rate reduction ‘rr’ is applied to all 
NPR’s traded between two farm without any family bond or without the combined trade of 
dairy quota. The more NPR’s are traded the less total NPR’s are available. The reduction rate 
‘rr’ has been introduced to obtain a gradual decline in the number of rights and therefore in a 
decline of the total animal production. The decline in animal production would help to bring 
Flanders in line with the objectives of the Nitrate directive.  
Eq. (9) simulates the policy measure that should prevent speculation because only the active 
farms can sell their NPR’s. The policy stops non active farms from holding on to their NPR’s 
and speculating on NPR price increases because after three years the unused NPR’s can not be 
sold anymore. During the simulations, the Eq.  (9) can be removed from the model to analyse 
the impact of this type of policy.  
4.2.1 Flat rate reduction on traded NPR’s 
The results of simulations of changes in the reduction rate ‘rr’ are performed with an initial 
distribution of NPR’s over the three farm types of 10, 5 and 0 for the farm 1, 2 and 3 
respectively. The penalty is set at 2 euro per unit of overuse of NPR’s. A multiperiod 
simulation is chosen for this scenario because the reduction is cumulative in time. The 
multiperiod results show in each case trade in the first year where trade is possible and for the 
remaining years a constant level of production. The results in Table 6 show the impact of 
changes in the reduction rate of traded NPR’s on the production and the distribution of the 
NPR’s over the three farm types. The results indicate that the objective of having a long term 
reducing effect on the production is only reached with small reductions on the traded NPR’s. 
Without policy intervention on the trade of NPR’s, 4 NPR’s are sold to the farm type 3. The 
introduction of a reduction of the traded NPR’s leads to the fact that 0.25 NPR’s are more 
sold to be able to satisfy the demand of the farm type 3. Yet, the net bought NPR’s decline 
with 0.2 NPR’s because the reduction rate of 10% reduces the total number of NPR’s 
obtained by the buyer. The net effect of the limited increase of the reduction rate is a decline 
in the total number of NPR’s and the total production. The striking result is that a further 
increase of the reduction rate from 0.1 to 0.2 or more leads to an increase of the production. 
The increase of the production can be explained by the fact that the reduction rate introduces a 
transaction cost leading to less trade in NPR’s. The farm types 1 and 2, with sufficient 
initially distributed NPR’s, sell less NPR’s and hold on to their production. Farm type 3 can 
not buy sufficient NPR’s to satisfy his demand and decides to produce beyond the NPR-limit 
and pay penalties for the overuse.  
The policy of having high transaction costs and penalties lower than the gross margin results 
therefore not in the expected reduction of the total production. The only positive element for 
policy makers is the increase in the government revenue by the higher penalties that have to 
be paid.  
Table 6. The changes in steady state production for the three farm types as function of 
changing the reduction rate of traded NPR’s  
‘rr’ farm type 1 farm type 2 farm type 3 Total 
 production NPR production NPR production NPR production NPR
0 8.6 8.6 2.2 2.2 4.2 4.2 15.0 15.0
0.1 8.4 8.4 2.1 2.1 4.0 4.0 14.5 14.5
0.2 8.6 8.6 2.1 2.1 4.0 3.4 14.7 14.1
0.3 8.8 8.8 2.2 2.2 4.0 2.8 15.0 13.8
0.4 9.1 9.1 2.3 2.3 4.0 2.2 15.3 13.5
0.5 9.4 9.4 2.4 2.4 4.0 1.6 15.8 13.4
 
The question now raises whether the theoretical situation would also occur in reality in the 
Flemish case with the current penalties for overuse of 2 euro per NPR, a reduction rate of 
25% and the observed gross margins. The answer to this question has two sub questions. Is 
animal production in Flanders profitable enough to survive with paying penalties for overuse 
of the NPR’s? Are there farms that would hold on to their NPR’s because the transaction cost 
of selling them is too high? 
The first question can be answered by comparing the gross margins per NPR with the penalty 
of overuse per NPR. The average gross margin for pig farms in the FADN is estimated at 4 
euro per NPR in 2006 with a standard deviation of 2.2 and 1.8 euro per NPR in 2007 with a 
standard deviation of 1.6. The administrative dataset confirms that a significant number of 
farms overuse their NPR’s. We can therefore conclude that it is very likely that some farms 
can overuse their NPR’s and can still survive by paying the penalties.  
The second question is also affirmed because it is very likely that farms exist using their 
NPR’s without selling them because their gross margin is between 75% and 100% of the 
penalty level of the overuse of NPR’s (2 euro). 
4.2.2 Prevention to trade unused NPR’s 
To illustrate the impact of the Eq. (9) the model simulates the same situation in one scenario 
with Eq. (9) included in the model and a second scenario without Eq. (9). The impact of the 
production and the division of the NPR’s of these two scenario’s are illustrated in Table 7 and 
Table 8 respectively. Notice that the trade in NPR’s in the model is only allowed after three 
years to have a base period calculation of how many NPR’s should be removed because they 
were not activated by corresponding production.  
The results of farm type 1 in Table 7 and Table 8 of the two scenarios give the same outcome 
because the reduction of unused NPR’s does not affect this farm type, nor in the selling of the 
NPR’s nor in the buying of NPR’s. As long as less than 25% of the NPR’s remain unused, the 
flat rate reduction is the limiting factor on the traded NPR’s.  
The situation of farm type 2 is different because the unconstrained production is 2.5, which is 
only 50% of the available NPR’s. The results in Table 7 show that the speculation prevention 
of Eq. (9) gives farm type 2 an incentive to produce more than otherwise economically 
optimal. Farm type 2 holds also longer on to the production to be able to sell more of its 
NPR’s as an attempt to avoid the impact of the speculation prevention. The selling of the 
NPR’s happens in two steps to further avoid the reduction of the unused traded NPR’s. From 
income point of view, the situation of farm type 2 is worse in the scenario with the 
speculation prevention of Eq. (9) because farm type 2 can sell less NPR’s and it has to 
maintain unprofitable production to be able to sell some more NPR’s.  
The fact that farm type 2 sells later its NPR’s and more of the NPR’s are withdrawn by the 
speculation prevention, implies that farm type 3 has to pay more penalties. This is especially 
true for the years 4 and 5 because of the postponed trade of the NPR’s. The production of 
farm type 3 is not affected because the optimal level of production is in both scenario’s 
determined by the level of the penalty.  
The overall effect of the policy intervention in Eq. (9) is negative from almost all 
perspectives. Eq. (9) reduces the income of two of the three farm types. The policy reduces 
the overall efficiency because the production of the non competitive farm type is stimulated. 
The production is increased in the short run, which is contradictory to the policy objective of 
environmental quota. The only positive element in the short and long run is the increase of 
government revenue from the higher penalties that have to be paid by farm type 3.  
Table 7. Changes of production and NPR’s during six years in the case the farms can not 
sell unused NPR’s beyond the flat rate reduction of 25% on traded NPR’s 
Year farm type 1 farm type 2 farm type 3 Total 
 production NPR production NPR production NPR production NPR
1 10.0 10.0 2.5 5.0 4.0 0.0 16.5 15.0 
2 10.0 10.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 0.0 17.0 15.0 
3 10.0 10.0 3.1 5.0 4.0 0.0 17.1 15.0 
4 8.7 8.7 3.1 5.0 4.0 1.0 15.8 14.7 
5 8.7 8.7 2.6 2.6 4.0 2.4 15.3 13.7 
6 8.7 8.7 2.2 2.2 4.0 2.7 14.9 13.6 
 
Table 8. Changes of production and NPR’s during six years with only a flat rate reduction 
of traded NPR’s 
Year farm type 1 farm type 2 farm type 3 Total 
 production NPR production NPR production NPR production NPR
1 10 10 2.5 5 4 0 16.5 15.0 
2 10 10 2.5 5 4 0 16.5 15.0 
3 10 10 2.5 5 4 0 16.5 15.0 
4 8.7 8.7 2.2 2.2 4 3.1 14.9 14.0 
5 8.7 8.7 2.2 2.2 4 3.1 14.9 14.0 
6 8.7 8.7 2.2 2.2 4 3.1 14.9 14.0 
 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The paper illustrates how the details of the implementation of different types of rules of 
production right transfers has an impact on production, efficiency, structural change and the 
effectiveness of the policy interventions. The paper confirms the earlier findings (Oskam and 
Speijers, 1992; Boots et al., 1997;  Colman, 2000; Van der Straeten et al., 2009a) that 
limitations on the rules of transfers lead to inefficiency.  
The current paper continues at the path paved by previous authors to use models to analyse 
different elements of the implementation of tradable production rights on the effectiveness 
and the efficiency of the policy. The paper uses a mixed integer programming model to 
simulate the short run reactions of trade taking into account that the discrete nature of trade 
leads to fixed transaction costs. The possible dynamic effects of policy interventions are 
simulated with a multi-period simulation model. The Flemish Nutrient Production Right 
(NPR) is used as case in both models.   
We accept that the simplified models are not able to simulate all elements that influence the 
trade in production rights but the simplified illustrative models are still useful to identify 
potential weaknesses in the policy design of tradable production right and their impact on 
production and structural evolution. In the case of the NPR’s in Flanders several possibilities 
for improvement could be suggested.  
The model of the short-run adaptation to the production rights has illustrated that the system 
of bilateral trade with fixed transaction costs depresses the trade of production rights leading 
to a less efficient distribution. The simulations confirm that the absence of an organised 
auction can partly explain why so many farms have to pay penalties for a shortage of 
production rights while at aggregate level there are more than enough production rights. This 
conclusion can be extrapolated to other cases where discrete trade between farms increases 
the fixed transaction costs.  
The same model could also illustrate that the fact that only completely stopping farms can 
participate in trade stimulates them to stop which might accelerate the structural change in the 
short run. The model has shown that the impact on the number of transactions in limited.  
The multiperiod simulation model with simplified synthetic data could further illustrate that 
policy measures that intervene in trade with the objective of reducing the amount of 
production rights do not always reach the objective. Besides the fact that the policy 
intervention in the trade of production rights leads to a lower efficiency, the increase of 
transaction costs combined with a relatively low penalty for overuse can make the policy 
intervention also very ineffective. The results indicate that the flat rate reduction on traded 
NPR’s in Flanders might even have a production stimulating effect, which is really an 
undesired outcome against the background of the environmental concerns that has motivated 
the introduction of the production rights. The only advantage of the flat rate reduction on 
traded NPR’s is the increase in government revenue from the penalties of overuse. The 
general lessons drawn from the paper is that a gradual reduction of production rights should 
not be reached by interventions in trade of the rights. The trade interventions increase the 
transaction costs, which, in turn, decrease the efficiency and even the effectiveness in the case 
of a wrong combination with the penalties for overuse of the production rights. A better 
alternative is to reduce the amount of NPR’s irrespective of the trade of the NPR’s. 
Also the final evaluated policy intervention shows that the current implementation in the case 
of the Flemish NPR’s is far from optimal. The policy makers want to avoid speculation by 
preventing farms from selling production rights that have not been used for three successive 
years. The multiperiod simulation model could also illustrate with synthetic data that the 
speculation prevention stimulates individual farms to increase their production the three years 
before selling the production rights. The overall result is again that the intervention in the 
trade of production rights decreases efficiency and is, furthermore, not effective because the 
production is stimulated. This final result can not be confirmed with actual data but anecdotic 
evidence exists that farms are stimulated to produce in order to make sure that as much as 
possible production rights remain valid.      
The overall conclusion is that the added policy value of the system NPR’s is not at all clear.  
In Flanders there also exists a detailed manure policy framework that regulates the manure 
use on land. This complementary policy has been described as a system of tradable 
concentration rights (Van der Straeten et al., 2010) and has the theoretical properties to 
become the efficient and effective policy to minimise the impact of the concentration of the 
pollution of animal production. 
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